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State-business relations in Russia in the 2000s: From 





Using data from a 2009 survey of 957 manufacturing enterprises, this paper examines relations be-
tween the state and business as well as priority differences in the distribution of governmental sup-
port by federal, regional and local authorities. Regression analysis reveals that a “model of ex-
change” is the predominant pattern as opposed to “state capture” (in the case of big firms) or “grab-
bing hand” (in the case of SMEs), both of which were typical of the 1990s. However, there are 
some differences in priorities at different levels of government. The federal government in 2007-
2008 provided more support to state-owned and mixed enterprises providing stable employment, 
while regional authorities  more often supported  firms  that were  pursuing  modernization. These 
trends could pave the way for a shift in governmental policy at the regional level from ”state cap-
ture”/”grabbing hand” to the Chinese-style “helping hand” model. 
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan yritysten ja julkisen vallan välisiä suhteita sekä julkisen tuen myöntä-
mistä kolmitasoisen federaation eri hallinnontasoilla. Tutkimusaineisto perustuu vuonna 2009 toteu-
tettuun liki 1 000 venäläistä teollisuusyritystä kattaneeseen yrityshaastatteluun. Regressiotulokset 
viittaavat siihen, että yritysten ja julkishallinnon välisiä suhteita kuvaa parhaiten molempia hyödyt-
tävä yhteistyö (model of exchange), toisin kuin 1990-luvulla, jolloin suhteita kuvasi joko yritysten 
ylivalta (state capture) tai poliitikkojen etujen maksimointi (grabbing hand). Tutkimuksessa osoite-
taan myös, että federaation eri hallinnontasot antavat yritystukia hieman erityyppisille yrityksille. 
Keskushallinto tuki vuosina 2007–2008 suhteellisesti enemmän vakaata työllisyyttä tarjoavia valti-
onyrityksiä, kun taas aluetasolla tuettiin useammin yrityksiä, jotka uudistivat tai modernisoivat tuo-
tantoaan. Etenkin aluetasolla julkisen vallan toiminta voi olla muuttumassa kohti markkinoiden vir-
heitä korjaavaa ns. auttava käsi (helping hand) -mallia.   
 
JEL: D22, H25, H71 
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1  Introduction  
 
The support given to firms by the Russian government at the federal, regional and local levels dur-
ing the financial crisis in 2008-2009 has once again called attention not only to the nature and 
mechanisms of interaction between the state and business, but also to the authorities’ priorities in 
allocating such support. 
The government-business nexus is not a new issue in Russia. It has been actively investi-
gated since the mid-1990s. On the one hand, a number of papers following the model by J. Stigler 
[1971] have lent credence to the thesis of “state capture” by large firms – particularly at the regional 
level [Hellman et al., 2000; Frye, Zhuravskaya, 2000; Slinko et al., 2004]. From their analysis of 
empirical data from the 1990s, the authors of these papers maintained that government support had 
been given mainly to old, large-scale privatized enterprises that performed poorly but had “special 
relationships with authorities” enabling them to blackmail the latter with possible social repercus-
sions if they did not provide support. The “grabbing hand” model was much more typical in the 
case of small and middle-sized de novo firms in the 1990s [Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998]. However, in a more recent paper, Timothy Frye presented the rather different hy-
pothesis of a “system of exchange” between enterprises and regional authorities [Frye, 2002]. Using 
the 2000 survey data of 500 firms from 8 regions of the Russian Federation, he demonstrated that 
those firms that received subsidies, tax relief or other government support also had to bear addi-
tional costs and obligations, such as price regulations, more frequent inspections and time lost in 
communication with the bureaucrats.   
Later on, in the 2000s, the policy of government support in Russia showed signs of change. 
In particular, according to the data from new enterprise surveys, regional authorities began to give 
assistance to growing firms that were restructuring and planning their investments (see  Frye et 
al.[2009], who arrived at a conclusion consistent with Ahrend [2008] based on an analysis of mac-
roeconomic data by region of the RF). These changes can be examined in terms of the “new indus-
trial policy” and “second-best institutions” concepts, which were elaborated by Dani Rodrik in re-
gard to developing and emerging economies [Rodrik, 2004; Rodrik, 2008], or in the framework of 
the “helping hand” model of Andrei Shleifer. They can also be interpreted as a Russian manifesta-
tion of the model of “fiscal federalism and political centralization”, which has been used by many 
researchers to explain the successful economic reforms in China [Montinola et al., 1995; Qian, 
1999; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001]. On the basis of these studies, we can also conclude that the Andrei Yakovlev 
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mechanisms for interaction between business and the state work better at the regional level, con-
trary to the views predominant in the 1990s that regional administrations were “rent-seekers” and 
that the federal government was more efficient. 
In this paper, we will try to determine which of the above-mentioned models – state cap-
ture, exchange between elites or new industrial policy – best describes the mechanisms of interac-
tion between business and the state at the federal, regional and local levels. In the following sections 
we will describe our data, research methodology and main hypotheses as well as the results of our 
empirical analysis. Our main findings will be given in the conclusion. 
 
 
2  Data 
 
We based our analysis on the results of a survey of 957 enterprise directors conducted in February-
June 2009 by the HSE Institute for Industrial and Market Studies together with the Levada Center, 
at the request of the Ministry of Economic Development for the second round of its monitoring of 
the competitive power of manufacturing industries. (The main results of the first round of the moni-
toring were described in Golikova et al.[2007] and Desai and Goldberg [2007]). 
  According to the monitoring program, the 2009 survey questionnaire asked firms about 
the intensity of competition; capital investments; export and innovative activities; ownership and 
control structures; their interaction with authorities; market conditions for labor and other produc-
tion factors; and major barriers to running a business. The questionnaire also included a special 
block of questions concerning the influence of the current crisis on the behavior of business enter-
prises.  
The surveyed enterprises were located in 48 regions and represented eight manufacturing 
sectors: food products, textiles; wearing apparel; wood and wood products; chemicals and chemical 
products; basic metals and fabricated metal products; machinery and equipment; electrical equip-
ment, electronic and optical products; and vehicles and other transport equipment. Company CEOs 
made up 67.5% of the respondents; deputy directors general in charge of finance and CFOs consti-
tuted 31%; and in 14 enterprises, the respondents held other positions. 
The parameters of our sample can be described in the following terms: the average sur-
veyed enterprise had 587 employees; 73% of them had been established before 1992 and 10% after 
1998. The government held stakes of 11%, and foreigners had shareholdings in 10% of the firms in 
the sample. 41% of the enterprises were located in regions with “below average” investment poten- 
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tial, and 30% were in regions with “above average” potential (as graded by the rating agency of The 
Expert weekly magazine). Of the total number of surveyed firms, 28% were members of business 
groups; 54% exported their products in 2008; and about two-thirds were controlled by a single 
dominant shareholder or a consolidated group of owners. The enterprises employed about 8% of the 




3  Interaction between firms and authorities: Descriptive statistics 
 
The questionnaire used in our survey enabled us to analyze relations between enterprises and au-
thorities in several directions. Firstly, we asked the enterprises whether or not they had received 
support from federal, regional or local authorities in 2007-2008. Secondly, we asked if they had ob-
tained any organizational support (meaning any sort of non-financial aid, including help in making 
contact with Russian and foreign partners, assistance in getting in touch with other government au-
thorities, aid in attracting investors, etc.). Lastly, our questionnaire inquired whether the enterprise 
had provided any assistance to regional and/or local authorities in 2007-2008 for the social devel-
opment  of  its  region  (including  maintenance  of  social  facilities  and  dwellings,  sponsoring  re-
gional/local programs, etc.). In the event that such help had been given, we also asked the enterprise 
to give the approximate size of its contribution as a percentage of its average annual net profits. 
Figure 1 presents the share of firms that received support from different levels of govern-
ment in 2007-2008. One can see from these data that regional authorities were the most active in 
giving support. In total, about 26% of the firms in our sample received help at this level; of these, 
19% obtained organizational support and 14% were given financial support. Furthermore, at the re-
gional and local levels, organizational forms of support were more common (this is most evident at 
the local level, where firms that received financial and organizational support differ in shares by a 
factor of 3 and greater). In contrast, the most frequently used tool at the federal level was financial 
support. 
 Another important form of interaction between enterprises and authorities is the rendering 
of corporate support to regional and local authorities for regional social development. In 2007-2008, 
as seen in Figure 2, only 23% of the total firms gave no help to authorities at all. However, the ma-
jority of enterprises allocated no more than 0.1% of their revenue from sales to assistance to au-Andrei Yakovlev 
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thorities (33% of the respondents stated this directly, and the 24% who found it difficult to estimate 
their expenses can probably also be included in this group). Taking into account that in 2007-2008 
the surveyed enterprises had an average profitability of sales of about 12%, one can assume that the 
majority of manufacturing firms allocated no more than 1% of their net earnings to the social devel-
opment of their regions – which is not a very large amount by global standards. 
 




Figure 2 Support by enterprises to regional and local authorities for the social development of their regions 
 
0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0%
… from local authorities  
… from regional authorities







Received financial support in 2007-2008





No, we gave no assistance
We gave assistance, but I cannot estimate the amount
We gave for assistance less than 0.1% of our total income from sales
We gave for assistance 0.1-0.3% of our total income from sales
We gave for assistance more than 0.3% of our total income from sales 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/ 2011 
 
 
  9 
When analyzing the relations between enterprises and authorities, it is important to point 
out that this “socially responsible” behavior was frequently rewarded. For instance, from 27% to 
34% of the firms that helped the authorities reported having received some type of government sup-
port at the regional level, as opposed to those that gave nothing for social development in their re-
gion (p<0.01). This correlation between rendering help to authorities and receiving support from 
them in return was also observed at the federal and local levels, but at a lesser level of significance 
(p<0.10 and p<0.05, respectively). 
 
 
4  Empirical strategy 
 
The two variables examined in the previous section – government support to enterprises and help 
given by enterprises to authorities for social development – were used as key variables in our re-
gression analysis of state-business interaction. Receipt of government support was used as a de-
pendent variable. We used a binary integral indicator showing both financial and organizational 
support. We examined the factors responsible for provision of assistance from the state at each level 
of government (federal, regional and local), and rendering help to the state served as one of the ex-
planatory variables. We also used a fairly large set of other explanatory variables, which can tenta-
tively be divided into three blocks: basic characteristics of enterprises and their performance indica-
tors, including parameters of their “social” and “modernization” activities. (A formal description of 
these variables is given in Tables 1a and 1b in Appendix.) 
In the first block, an enterprise was asked about its industrial affiliation, its size and year of 
establishment, the investment potential of its region of location, and the ownership structure (the 
government’s stake in its capital as well as the presence of foreign shareholders). Our arguments for 
choosing these variables in particular for our “basic” model were as follows: 
 
- The level of regional development (the facilities of the region in question, and preferential treat-
ment of highly or poorly developed regions by the federal center) can affect the scale and types of 
government support; 
- Large companies and state-owned enterprises usually have better access to government admini-
stration, so we presume that they receive government support more quickly than the smaller or pri-
vate companies; Andrei Yakovlev 
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- Attracting foreign investment has supposedly been one of the cornerstones of Russia’s economic 
policy for a long time. We therefore presume that enterprises with foreign stakes will receive pref-
erential treatment in obtaining government support;  
-  The enterprises whose history goes back to the Soviet era usually have closer ties with authorities, 
and for this reason they are more likely to become recipients of government support. 
 
At the same time we assumed that, besides these basic factors, decisions to allocate government 
support  could  also  depend  on  at  least  on  two  areas  of  enterprise  activity:  “social  responsibil-
ity”/contacts with authorities and modernization activities (including capital investments, innova-
tions, etc.). 
To describe the “social activity” of the enterprises, along with the above-mentioned assis-
tance to local and regional authorities for regional social development, we looked at two more fac-
tors from our questionnaire: conservation and/or creation of new jobs and membership of the re-
spondent firms in business associations. Support of employment (preservation and/or creation of 
new jobs) can be a component in the “system of exchange” between business and the state. In turn, 
business associations are one of important channels of interaction between enterprises and authori-
ties [Pyle, 2006]. For example, according to data from the 2005 Russian-Japanese survey, enter-
prises singled out contacts with authorities as the second most significant function of business asso-
ciations [Dolgopyatova et al., 2009].  
The  enterprises’  participation  in  modernization  activities  can  be  described  in  terms  of 
many indicators. In this case, we based our analysis on three variables: 
 
- Presence of exports (all other factors being equal, entry into export markets implies that an enter-
prise has a greater competitive edge); 
- Capital investment activity in 2005-2008 (the respondent firms were divided into three groups – 
those investing nothing at all, those investing little and those carrying out large investment pro-
jects); 
- Innovation activity (we assigned to this category the firms that had introduced a new product or a 
new technology and had nonzero R&D expenditures). 
 
We analyzed the determining factors at all three levels of government for giving support to 
enterprises using a set of probit regressions with marginal effects. We identified four models for 
each level of government. Model 1 was built solely of “basic” variables. Models 2 and 3 included  
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the basic variables and, respectively, variables of “social” and “modernization” activities. Model 4 
embraced the whole set of variables, which enabled us to test the robustness of the results obtained 
for models 1-3. Finally, in model 4a, for an additional robustness check, we assessed the influence 
of the same variables in an incomplete sample comprising only the private enterprises. 
 
 
5  Empirical results and discussion 
 
The main results of the regression analysis of factors responsible for the allotment of government 
support are given in Tables 2-4. Having summed up the results, we can state the following. 
The first point, which is common to all levels of government, is that government support is 
more frequently given to firms in regions with low or average investment potential. This holds true 
for support at the federal level as well, which suggests to us that the federal government intends its 
support mainly for “equalization” of levels across regions rather than for the creation of incentives 
for development. The second common point is that in all cases, old firms dating back to the Soviet 
era clearly have preferential access to government support. This difference (in the negative) is most 
evident in the category of firms established in 1991-1998. For the firms that became active in 1999 
or later, the probability of obtaining support is also lower than for old “Soviet” enterprises, but the 
corresponding coefficients are statistically significant only in the models of support from regional 
authorities. 
It is also interesting to note that in all models the factor of enterprise size ultimately turned 
out to be insignificant. To be exact, enterprise size is positively correlated with the probability of 
receiving support at the federal and regional levels in models 1 and 3 (the “basic” one and the one 
with “social activity” variables). However, the influence of this factor became insignificant if the 
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Table 2 Factors responsible for obtaining  support from federal authorities   
Explanatory variables 











Marginal  effects 
Investment potential of a region 
а)   Average  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04* 
High  -0.08***  -0.06**  -0.08***  -0.06**  -0.06** 
Size (natural logarithm of number of employees )  0.03***  0.02*  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Time of establishment of 
a firm 
b) 
1991-1998  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.09*** 
1999 and later  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04 
Government stake in capital (yes = 1, no = 0)  0.12**  0.11**  0.14***  0.13**  Х 
Foreign shareholder (yes = 1, no = 0)  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04 
Membership of a firm in business associations (yes = 1, no 
= 0)    0.03    0.02  0.02 
Help to regional and local authorities (yes = 1, no = 0)    0.04    0.03  0.02 
Changes in jobs 
c) 
Preservation (+/-5% by 2007)    0.07**    0.06**  0.06** 




Minor      0.03  0.03  0.03 
Large      0.05*  0.04  0.04 
Presence of exports (yes = 1, no = 0)      -0.00  0.00  0.00 
Actively innovating enterprise (yes = 1, no = 0)      0.06**  0.05  0.03 
Control for sector included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LL  -246  -224  -240  -221  -200 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke)  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.16 
Number of observations  742  696  735  691  653 
Notes to this and following tables: 
а) In comparison with firms from regions with low investment potential; 
b) In comparison with firms established in 1990 or earlier;  
c) In comparison with firms having cut jobs in 2008 by 5% or more; 
d) In comparison with firms that made no investments in 2005-2008. 
Statistical significance of regression coefficients:  *** - p<0.01;   ** -  p<0.05;  * - p<0.10. 
All variables in following tables are coded in the same way. 
 
The federal level was found to possess some special features: we observed, for example, that 
this is the only level where definite privileges are given to firms with government stakes. At the 
same time, federal support is focused on firms that preserve jobs (the coefficient of the “job crea-
tion” variable is also positive but less significant). On the other hand, “modernization” variables for 
federal support proved to be mostly statistically insignificant (the only exception is model 3, in 
which innovation activity was significant at the 5% level, and large-scale investments at the 10% 
level). This combination allows us to speak of a certain “conservative system of exchanges”, i.e. 
when the federal  government gives  support to  old  enterprises and companies with  government 
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Table 3   Factors responsible for obtaining support from regional authorities 
  












Investment potential of a 
region
 а) 
Average  -0.08**  -0.06*  -0.08**  -0.07*  -0.06 
High  -0.20***  -0.18***  -0.20***  -0.19***  -0.20*** 
Size (natural logarithm of number of employees)  0.06***  0.05***  0.03*  0.02  0.01 
Time of establishment of a 
firm 
b) 
1991-1998  -0.08**  -0.07*  -0.09**  -0.08*  -0.10** 
1999 and later  -0.09*  -0.09  -0.10*  -0.10*  -012** 
Government stake in capital   0.09  0.14*  0.12*  0.19**  Х 
Foreign shareholder  0.09  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.04 
Membership of a firm in business associations     0.07**    0.06  0.06* 
Help to regional and local authorities    0.12***    0.10**  0.09** 
Changes in jobs 
c) 
Preservation (+/-5% 
by 2007)    0.01    -0.01  0.01 
Creation of new jobs    0.06    0.03  0.01 
Investments in 2005-2008
 d) 
Minor      0.05  0.07  0.09* 
Large      .013***  0.15***  0.17*** 
Presence of exports      -0.07*  -0.06  -0.06 
Actively innovating enterprise      0.05  0.04  0.06 
Control for sector included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
LL  -373  -342  -362  -221  -307 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke)   0.10  0.12  0.12  0.17  0.15 




Table 4   Factors responsible for obtaining support from local authorities 














of a region 
а) 
Average  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.03 
High  -0.09***  -0.08**  -0.10***  -0.08**  -0.08** 
Size (natural logarithm of number of employees)  0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Time of establish-
ment of a firm 
b) 
1991-1998  -0.07*  -0.06  -0.07*  -0.06  -0.06 
1999 and later  -0.06  -0.05  -0.06  -0.05  -0.08 
Government stake in capital   -0.02  -0.01  -0.00  0.03  Х 
Foreign shareholder   0.15***  0.15***  0.14***  0.15***  0.18*** 
Membership of a firm in business associations     0.05*    0.05  0.05 
Help to regional and local authorities    0.07**    0.08**  0.07* 
Changes in jobs 
c) 
Preservation (+/-5% by 2007)    0.05    0.05  0.06 




Minor      0.06  0.05  0.04 
Large      0.07*  0.06  0.06 
Presence of exports      -0.00  0.01  0.02 
Actively innovating enterprise      0.02  0.01  0.02 
Control for sector included  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
LL  -329  -305  -325  -302  -282 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke)  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.08 
Number of observations  742  696  735  691  653 
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At the regional and local levels, the range of determining factors for government support to firms is 
very different. Firstly, the practice of rendering assistance to authorities for social development in a 
region is statistically significant in all models. This can be taken as a clear sign that the “system of 
exchanges” actually exists. Secondly, membership in business associations is also an important pre-
condition for receiving support from regional authorities, which corroborates the assumption that 
business associations are a channel for interaction between business and the state. However, con-
trary to reasonable expectations, preserving jobs appears to be inessential for obtaining support at 
the regional and local levels. The same holds true for government stakes in enterprise ownership – 
this factor affects provision of government support only in two of our models at the regional level. 
In other cases, the relevant coefficients are positive, but the influence of this factor on a dependent 
variable stays within the limit of statistical error. 
At the same time, as opposed to measures of federal support at the regional and local lev-
els, a number of variables describing “modernization” and “restructuring” activities appear to be 
significant at the enterprise level. For instance, the implementation of large-scale investment pro-
jects by enterprises in 2005-2008 was a highly significant for providing support in the framework of 
models for regional authorities. At the local level, enterprises with foreign stakes in their ownership 
structure were much more common recipients of support in 2007-2008. 
On the other hand, this is a cause-effect question: do regional and local authorities support 
firms that invest and enter new markets, or do these firms expand and invest due to government 
support? The data obtained for our study have a limitation: according to the nature of the study, we 
could question only “insiders” – i.e. the firms that were already present in regional marketplaces 
and had well-established ties with authorities, which allowed them to feel more comfortable than 
non-admitted “outsiders”. A hypothesis about this kind of “alliance of insiders” (represented by re-
gional authorities and local firms) was already put forth in [Yakovlev and Frye, 2010]. In favor of 
this hypothesis are the preferences for old enterprises established before 1991, which we found in 
for all levels of government. However, preferences for firms with foreign stakes contradict this hy-
pothesis and at least provide evidence for the existence of different criteria for the provision of gov-
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6  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
In this paper, we examined different forms of interaction between firms and authorities at different 
levels of government using the results of a survey of 957 industrial enterprises. Our results enabled 
us to conclude that the dominant pattern of relations between enterprises and the government is the 
“model of exchange”. In exchange for receiving support, recipient enterprises provide help for the 
social development of their respective regions or ensure the preservation of jobs. 
Nevertheless, for 2007-2008 we clearly detected a divergence of priorities with respect to 
the provision of government support as between the federal level versus the regional-local level. In 
the first case, the well-established “system of exchange” between the state and business was more 
conservative and focused on old enterprises, companies with government stakes, and firms that pre-
served jobs. In the second case, government support was more oriented towards modernization: the 
investment activity of firms and presence of foreign investors were among the criteria for its alloca-
tion. These results give us grounds to believe that a shift is taking place in governmental policy at 
the regional and local levels in Russia towards the Chinese-style “helping hand” model with possi-
ble positive impact of state interventions on economic development. 
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Financial support from   Organizational support from 
federal  regional  local  Federal  Regional  Local 
    authorities   Authorities 
All sample  957  10%  14%  6%  6%  19%  18% 
Investment potential of  
a region  
low  396  13%  17%  5%  7%  25%  20% 
average  274  11%  17%  8%  8%  22%  22% 
high  287  5%  7%  3%  4%  8%  10% 
Statistical significance of differences  ***  ***  **    ***  *** 
Number of employees 2007 
  
  
Less 100  123  8%  10%  5%  3%  15%  16% 
101 -  250  303  10%  10%  4%  4%  14%  15% 
251-500  228  11%  19%  4%  4%  18%  18% 
501 - 1000  163  7%  20%  7%  6%  25%  25% 
1001 and more  138  14%  13%  11%  17%  29%  15% 








Food industry  235  17%  22%  7%  4%  19%  22% 
Textiles and sewing  89  16%  25%  7%  4%  19%  18% 
Timber and woodworking  81  2%  7%  1%  1%  23%  16% 
Chemical production  88  5%  10%  1%  3%  18%  14% 
Metallurgy and metal working  98  1%  4%  4%  5%  14%  14% 
Electrical, electronic and optical equipment  117  22%  10%  7%  17%  21%  18% 
Transport vehicles and equipment  86  7%  12%  8%  8%  24%  19% 
Machinery and equipment  163  3%  13%  6%  6%  17%  15% 
Statistical significance of differences  ***  ***    ***     
Time of establishment of  
a firm 
  
1990 and before  701  12%  16%  6%  7%  21%  19% 
1991-1998  164  4%  9%  4%  2%  17%  16% 
1999 and later  92  7%  10%  8%  4%  11%  11% 
Statistical significance of differences  ***  **    **     
Government stake in capital No stake   708  9%  13%  4%  5%  17%  16% 
Government has stake in the firm  88  23%  19%  13%  22%  27%  22% 
n/a  158  9%  15%  9%  5%  23%  23% 
Statistical significance of differences  ***    ***  ***  **  * 
Foreign shareholder  No stake  675  9%  14%  4%  5%  16%  15% 
Foreigners have stake in the firm  78  12%  13%  9%  9%  26%  23% 
Statistical significance of differences      **    **   Table 1b Performance indicators of firms that received governmental support in 2007-2008 
  Number of 
firms 
Financial support from   Organizational support from 
federal  regional  local  federal  regional  local 
      authorities  authorities  
Membership of a firm in 
business associations 
Non-members  573  10.0%  11.5%  5.1%  4.4%  15.0%  14.7% 
Members  342  10.2%  19.3%  7.0%  8.8%  26.0%  21.9% 
Statistical significance of differences    ***    ***  ***  *** 
Assistance to the regional 
and local authorities 
No, we gave no assistance  219  7.8%  6.8%  3.7%  2.3%  10.5%  11.0% 
We gave assistance, but I cannot estimate the 
amount  312  10.9%  15.4%  5.5%  6.4%  18.3%  18.6% 
We gave for assistance less than 0.1% of   
revenue from sales  139  11.6%  18.1%  5.8%  5.1%  23.9%  19.6% 
We gave for assistance 0.1-0.3% of revenue 
from sales  58  8.6%  19.0%  5.2%  5.2%  22.4%  19.0% 
We gave for assistance more than 0.3% of 
revenue from sales  229  10.9%  16.6%  7.9%  10.5%  24.5%  20.5% 
Statistical significance of differences    ***    ***  ***  * 
Changes in jobs  Destruction of jobs (95% and less by 2007)  361  7.5%  12.7%  3.9%  3.6%  17.2%  15.2% 
Preservation (+/-5% by 2007)  365  12.1%  13.4%  5.2%  7.4%  18.9%  20.0% 
Creation of new jobs (105% and more by 2007)  191  11.5%  20.4%  9.4%  9.4%  25.1%  18.8% 
Statistical significance of differences  *  **  **  **  *   
Investments in  2005-2008  No investment  284  6,4%  8,8%  5,3%  5,7%  13,4%  14,1% 
minor  277  11,6%  10,8%  5,1%  6,5%  19,9%  19,1% 
large  372  12,1%  21,8%  6,2%  6,2%  23,1%  18,8% 
Statistical significance of differences  **  ***      ***   
Presence of exports in 2008  No export  493  11,4%  14,8%  5,3%  4,7%  16,1%  18,1% 
10% of sales or less  240  7,5%  16,3%  4,2%  6,3%  20,0%  17,5% 
11% of sales or more  182  8,8%  12,1%  7,7%  8,2%  25,3%  16,5% 
Statistical significance of differences          **   
ISO certification    No  487  10,5%  15,0%  4,5%  3,5%  16,3%  16,5% 
Yes   470  9,8%  13,6%  6,8%  8,9%  21,9%  18,5% 
Statistical significance of differences        ***  **   
Innovation activity  No   676  9,5%  12,9%  4,9%  3,9%  15,7%  16,6% 
Yes  281  11,7%  17,8%  7,5%  11,7%  27,0%  19,6% 
Statistical significance of differences    **    ***  ***   
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